Somalia: Security Council adopts resolution to keep hackers at bay
The visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed to Damascus on Tuesday, November 9, 2021 and the meeting with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, sparked a great controversy which began as soon as he was announced, which was emphasized by the West. analysis mainly from outside the region, that it is a (comprehensive Arab reassessment of the reality of the relationship with Syria and its importance in the fight against terrorism in the region, and the importance of the current Syrian reality in the calculations of the Arab countries and the Gulf security, mainly towards Iran, and breaking the American “Caesar law” in order to impose an economic blockade on Syria), and various analyzes and speculations on the future of these have multiplied. The UAE approach, its implications and dimensions in Arab and Gulf relations vis-à-vis the Syrian regime, and whether it represents one of the indicators of the transition to a new phase of political action towards openness to Damascus, and the return of Syria in its regional and international role. Especially with the clarification of the “Emirati-Syrian coordination” some time before this visit to arrange the rapprochement between the two parties, which became clear by the announcement of the contact between the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi (Sheikh Mohammed ben Zayed and President Bashar Al-Assad), as well as an official invitation to Syria to participate in the “International Expo Exhibition In Dubai” then my meeting with the Syrian and Emirati oil ministers in Moscow.
But what stopped me in this visit to the Emirates were perhaps other events that were not addressed in these analyzes, which caught my attention analytically and academically, and most different of them. them was (I was alerted by a foreign researcher during my comment on the same analysis, that the UAE movement is primarily in the interests of Tehran the Iranian regime, not to suffocate and besiege Iran in its areas influence and its known role in Syria). Despite the strangeness of this analysis, I dealt with another topic to answer it, concerning: even clearer to the public is the organization of joint naval exercises in the Red Sea with the Israeli joint naval forces with Bahrain and United Arab Emirates), together with the aforementioned visit.
As a result, my analysis focuses primarily on whether this visit took place through (organizing and coordinating with Tel Aviv to curb Iran in Syria and the region, again drawing Syria in towards the Arab League and collective Arab action), and the rejection of the Gulf and Arab reservations towards the process of rapprochement. The Syrian-Iranian, or have I aimed for a clearer rapprochement of the Gulf with Iran by the rapprochement with Syria, as I have gone to a number of predominantly Western analyzes, which I have received. From there, the Egyptian researcher will analyze all of the following:
Analysis of the implications of the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates (Bin Zayed) to Syria on November 9, 2021.
And its relationship with the “joint naval maneuvers” between (Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain) in the Red Sea on November 10, 2021 on Iranian existence in Syria
The visit of (the head of the Israeli Mossad intelligence service in Bahrain) during joint naval maneuvers with Israel in the Red Sea, with (the visit of the commander of the United Arab Emirates Air Force to Israel).
Then, finally, analyze the impacts of the Israeli intelligence movements of the Mossad in the Red Sea on its rapprochement with the USA vis-à-vis (China, Russia and Iran).
To answer these questions it is necessary to verify and respond to a number of inquiries and other different analysis, such as:
The motivations of the United Arab Emirates to take such a step towards rapprochement with Syria, through the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates “Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed” to Damascus on Tuesday, November 9, 2021, and the meeting with the president Syrian “Bashar Al-Assad”.
On the contrary, will these Emirates take a step (encourage the rest of the Arab countries to follow in the footsteps of the Emirates) and open up to the Syrian regime?
What is the fate of “the Syrian opposition to the Emirati-Syrian rapprochement”, and does this approach by the Emirates aim to weaken the track of the Syrian opposition, in particular the Syrians opposed to the regime of President “Bashar Al- Assad ”abroad?
Then it will remain to be analyzed (the options of the Syrian opposition if more Arab countries open up to the Al-Assad regime).
Will there be a (Syrian-Emirati consensus) towards the process of resolving the (return of Syrian refugees from abroad and the settlement of their situation with the current Syrian regime)?
Finally, the question arises, concerning: (the impact of the intensity of the American and international criticisms of the approach of rapprochement of the United Arab Emirates with the Syrian regime and the president “Bashar Al-Assad” on the completion of the stages Arab states aimed at integrating and returning Syria once again to its membership in the League of Arab States)?
In fact, the most dangerous and important analysis for me remains completely analytical, namely: (what was raised about the UAE getting the green light from the United States of America itself- themselves and on the Israeli side before the visit of the UAE Foreign Minister “Bin Zayed” to the Emirates, in search of training (Gulf-UAE-Israel alliance against Iran) and seeking to neutralize the Syrian regime in the face of these Iranian initiatives as a closely related ally of the Iranians?) Accordingly, we can analyze this as follows:
Perhaps what reinforces and supports my recent point of view regarding “mobilizing the Gulf of Israel with help from the United Arab Emirates and support from Washington to confront Iran through Syria” is (the coordination joint security between Israel and the UAE and Bahraini naval forces to conduct joint naval maneuvers in the Red Sea, which lasted for five full days), which began on Wednesday, November 10, 2021, coinciding with the rapprochement of the United Arab Emirates with Syria, that is to say:
(There are joint security agreements between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain vis-à-vis Iran through the movement of rapprochement with Syria as an ally of Iran)
As I mentioned, the joint naval maneuvers between Israel and the United Arab Emirates at the same time as the visit of the United Arab Emirates confirm this (the continuation of the joint security coordination between Israel and the United Arab Emirates), in particular to slow down and limit Iranian influence. Knowing that the stage of joint security coordination between the Emirates and Israel began three years ago, when the naval forces of the Gulf States, mainly the “UAE and Bahrain”, began to conduct joint naval maneuvers with the party. Israel, who were the first for ever with their Israeli counterpart, in cooperation with the United States Navy forces.
We find that the current joint naval maneuvers in the Red Sea with the participation of the United Arab Emirates and Israel, with the participation of (warships of the Emirates, Bahrain and Israel), in addition to the United States of America, is a “-Gulf assertion” to send a message to the Iranian side, that these naval maneuvers with Israel, aim to:
“Secure maritime traffic against Iran, and seek to secure the movement of straits and maritime navigation in the Red Sea with the help of Israeli security, especially since these joint maritime training operations included training on encirclement and raid tactics ”
This was confirmed by the US Naval Forces Central Command, in an official statement, to confirm that:
“The Israeli, Emirati and Bahraini training aims to improve the ability to work collectively among the forces participating in the maneuvers”
From there, we understand that the stage of joint Israeli-UAE security coordination, and the consequent stage of joint naval maneuvers, came after the signing of the “Abraham Accords” in September 2020, and the normalization of their relations. with Israel by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Since then, it has strengthened diplomatic, military and intelligence relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as the two most important Gulf countries that share Tel Aviv’s concerns regarding the activities of the Iran in the Red Sea and the region).
Most important here is (the visit of Israeli intelligence chief Mossad during a public visit to Bahrain during joint naval maneuvers with Israel in the Red Sea, with the UAE Air Force commander heading towards the at the same time also during a first such visit to Israel in October 2021).
Overall, the (reopening of the UAE and Bahrain embassies in Damascus) in December 2018, was seen at the time as (a major shift in Gulf policy towards Syria, and was among the earliest indications of more global standardization). There is no doubt that these measures came after consulting Saudi Arabia. However, it appears that Saudi Arabia, as usual, is adopting a cautious and secretive stance towards the rapprochement with Syria movement due to its fear of “Al-Assad’s regime’s relations with Tehran.”
At the time, the UAE and Bahrain were talking (about the geopolitical benefits of rehabilitating President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime). The State of Bahrain confirmed that “Bashar Al-Assad’s integration process aims to strengthen the Arab role and prevent regional interference in Syrian affairs”.
The most important analytical question for me is whether Abu Dhabi has completely severed its relations with Damascus, given (the continued presence of prominent Syrian figures loyal to Damascus living and working in the Emirates).
In general, this (continuous flow of signals from Damascus and other Arab capitals, led by the Emirates for rapprochement with Syria), indicates that former opponents of the Syrian government are about to strike mutually beneficial deals with the Syrian government, some of which pledged a few years ago to abandon it.
The most important gains for the Syrian regime from this rapprochement with the United Arab Emirates and the rest of the Arab countries will be (reconstruction contracts for Syria and energy agreements), in addition to the markets that will be opened to it if they are reconciled with Arab countries. countries, which could later pave the way for “the re-inclusion of Damascus and its return to the League of Arab States”, which is of course the most important strategic step for the United Arab Emirates and the states of the United Arab Emirates. Gulf, to help Syria return to the “Arab House”, and consequently pressured it not to come close to Iran, as it is a rival adversary of the United Arab Emirates. and the Gulf States.
In this context, the Syrian capital, Damascus now hopes (influential Arab voices to exert international pressure to lift the severe sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime), which aims to (punish Syrian officials and Syrian organizations for their alleged involvement in human rights violations).